The Crisis in Non-Financial Companies

As we look about the business landscape we find that many older, former blue-chip, firms are on the brink of financial collapse. Given the shrinkage of credit, many are asking if these firms have enough cash to survive a major recession. GM is looking to the possibility of using the Fed’s discount window and GE has already started marketing commercial paper to the Fed. Why are these firms so cash poor that they have to go to extremes to survive?

I blame the Wall Street analysts and the MBA programs of America. In the last 40 years there has been a growing emphasis on distributing cash to share-holders at the expense of a company’s future financial health. About eight years ago I spoke with the management of a firm which had recently moved from listing on the American Stock Exchange to listing on the New York Stock Exchange. Management was flabbergasted when the stock analysts assigned to their firm said that they could not recommend buying the company’s stock because they didn’t owe enough money. The company’s management had always pursued a program of internal financing. They believed that low leverage (borrowing) ratios meant lower costs to share holders and safety in the event of an economic turn-down. The analysts insisted that the company should do more borrowing and hand the excess cash over to the shareholders.

UPDATE 9/27/2011: THE FIRM IS NOW PRIVATELY HELD

Almost all publicly traded companies are faced with this dilemma: Do they look to the long term financial health of the company or do we put emphasis on maximizing short-term shareholder value? The fact is that that the two may be mutually exclusive. High cash distributions may enhance short-term shareholder value while undermining long term financial heath. It is similar to the kick an addict gets from cocaine. It feels good every time the addict gets a hit. However, the addict’s long-term physical health is at risk.

As a product of several of America’s business schools I am well aware of the financial analyses that are being taught. I also understand the economic theory underlying the analytic thought processes. The problem lies in the fact that most of the analysts are working from a strictly academic angle. Most have never worked outside of the financial sector and have no notion of how a firm producing real as opposed to financial worth operates. The crux of the problem is that they treat all wealth creation as if it were financial wealth. This leads to a casino mentality where the emphasis is on short-term results. We end up in a world where there are no investors. All we end up with is traders. If you don’t believe this, just look at the turn-over ratios of some of our largest pension plans. The ratios often indicate that the portfolios are being completely liquidated and repurchased more than once every year. This is not investing. It is gambling masquerading as an investment strategy.

If we want America’s firms to survive, we need to break this gambling mentality. We need to restructure the nature of business education. We need to realize that risk is more than the financial analysts’ notion of price variability. They believe that diversification will get rid of the specific risk of bankruptcy. What they fail to recognize is that the emphasis on leverage increases the bankruptcy risk of all firms. If all firms are under increased bankruptcy risk then specific risk becomes market risk and it is impossible to diversify it away.